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ZONING BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FINANCED
EMINENT DOMAIN (ZSAFED)*
DONALD G. HAGMAN**

Nirvana is a mythical unspoiled island located just offshore of an expanding Florida metropolis. Although it was zoned many years ago for
single family residences, the island was never developed. The owners have
recently announced plans to build on their property. Conservationists oppose
the development, but the government does not have enough money to purchase the island.
A politically acceptable compromise would be to develop only the south
half of the island, preserving the north half for conservation purposes.
Accordingly, experts of zoning by special assessment financed eminent domain
(ZSAFED) propose a plan to implement the compromise.1 While the south
half would be upzoned to multiple family use, the north half would be
downzoned to conservation and recreation uses. The owners of the north
half would be injured to the extent that their property has become worthless.
Under ZSAFED, damages would be paid to these owners since the right to
develop the north half would be treated as if it had been damaged by
eminent domain. Owners of the south end would enjoy an increase in the
value of their property from the change in zoning not only because the supply
of property in competition for sales would shrink but also because the
south half could be developed more intensively. Therefore, a special assess*This article is a product of the Windfalls for Wipeouts Project, a review of laws
and practices in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England, and the United States

(CANZEUS). The project aims to determine how to recapture increases in land values
and to mitigate decreases in land values. It is funded by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Policy Development and Research, United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, as a Comprehensive Planning Research and Demonstration Project under
Section 701(b) of the Housing Act of 1954, as amended. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author, views with which the Department neither necessarily agrees
nor disagrees. The final version of this project will be disseminated in WNDFALS FOR
WIPEOUTS? LAND VALuE GAINS AND LOSSES FRoM

FOR RMISTRIBUTING THEmr

PLANNING AND A CATALOG OF METHODS

(D. Hagman & D. Misczynski, ed. forthcoming), a book to be

published by the American Society of Planning Officials.
**B.S. 1954, Marquette University; LL.B. 1959, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1963,
Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. For a discussion of alternative plans, see Carmichael, Transferable Development
Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. Rxv. 35 (1974); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YAUm L.J. 75 (1973); Haik, Police Power
versus Condemnation, 7 NAT. REsouRcEs LAW 21 (1974); Marcus, Mandatory Development

Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24
BuFr. L. REv. 77 (1974); Rose, Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Expanding
Concept, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 330 (1975); Rose, Proposalfor the Separation and Marketability
of Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 635
(1974); Note, Compensable Regulations: Outline of a New Land Use Planning Tool,
10 WLLA rE L.J. 451 (1974).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

1

FloridaOF
LawFLORIDA
Review, Vol.
Iss. 3 [1967], Art. [Vol.
2 XXVIII
UNIVERSITY
LAW28,REVIEW
ment would be levied against the south half property, capturing the windfall
to finance payment for damages to the north half.
ANCIENT

ZSAFED

Missouri
ZSAFED was invented in 1893 by residents of Gladstone Boulevard in
Kansas City who were attempting to preserve the residential character of
their street. 2 The Gladstonians petitioned to exclude business uses within
150 feet of the boulevard and offered to pay damages or assess benefits to
affected property owners. Perhaps since experts opined that boulevard property
would appreciate from the restriction and no damages would be paid, some
disgruntled property owners3 brought suit seeking to invalidate the implementing ordinance.4 The basic question was whether the restriction constituted
a taking for public use. The court had no trouble construing this restriction
as a taking and found, in addition, that the city charter, which permitted
the use of eminent domain for public purposes, was sufficient to authorize the
ordinance. 5
ZSAFED did not surface in the Missouri appellate courts again until
1966.6 Coleman Highlands, one of the finest and most central residential areas
in Kansas City, had been restricted to single family dwellings. 7 Most of the
houses contained 10 to 14 rooms and were occupied by families with children.8
Some houses located along a major thoroughfare had been converted to
apartment units. Recalling the 1893 ordinance, the vast majority of Coleman
Highlands residents asked for the application of ZSAFED, and on December
6, 1963, it was instituted.'0
The application of ZSAFED resulted in a determination of damages of
$37,588.88 and an assessment for benefits of the same amount." Most of the
damages were to be paid to the landowners of apartment units located along
the thoroughfare. These landowners, the primary group unhappy with the
imposition of ZSAFED to enable the single family restriction to be enforced,
attacked the ordinance in court.' 2 Given the earlier judicial decision upholding
2. Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923).
3. It is not clear whether the district under restriction and the benefit district were
the same. The dissent in Liebi speaks of those "owning property on said boulevard and in
the adjacent territory defined as the 'benefit district.'" Id. at 602, 252 S.W. at 411 (emphasis
added).
4. Id. at 569, 252 S.W. at 404.
5. Id. at 575, 252 S.W. at 409.
6. Kindle v. Kansas City, 401 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1966).
7. Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Mo. 1969). While the record is not
clear, the restrictions were probably originally imposed as restrictive covenants. In any
event, the city extended the provisions for 20 years by ordinance in 1923 and again
extended the restrictions for 20 years in 1943.
8.

Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.at 811.
11. Id.at810.
12. Kindle v. Kansas City, 401 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1966).
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restriction under ZSAFED, 13 proponents of the ordinance expected no trouble.
However, the Missouri supreme court, wanting more facts, sent the matter
back to the trial court for a determination of whether the ordinance was
passed primarily for public or for private benefit.'4 When the case returned
to the supreme court,15 ZSAFED was sustained; the court applauded this
zoning technique for its usefulness in preserving a residential neighborhood
and for its method of compensating landowners for any demonstrably sub16
santial damages that were suffered. The court regarded the earlier decision17
as precedent, despite the fact that in the earlier case the character of property
along a public street had been preserved, whereas in this decision the court
sustained the use of ZSAFED to preserve a sizeable subdivision for residential
use. 8
Minnesota:ZSAFED Upheld
In 1912, some residents of Minneapolis desired to live in areas undisturbed
by apartment and commercial uses. The city council met this demand by precluding the erection of commercial buildings and apartment houses over
two and one-half stories on the exclusive Dupont Avenue South. 9 When
questions were raised about the legality of a city's imposing such a restriction,
the state legislature supplied the necessary authority. 20 Thus, zoning was
instituted in Minnesota, and on this basis the Minneapolis building inspector
began denying building permits for apartment buildings. The Minnesota
courts, however, concluded that zoning was not a proper exercise of the
police power. 2' In response to the invalidation of their authority, planners
felt that payment of compensation for the taking of the right to develop for
apartment and commercial use -would overcome constitutional objections.
This theory was based on cases that had upheld restriction on the right to
develop if compensation was paid. 22 Therefore, "in great haste and with
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923).
Kindle v. Kansas City, 401 S.W.2d 385, 588 (Mo. 1966).
Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
Id. at 816.
Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (Mo. 1923).

18. Opponents of ZSAFED in Kindle attempted to distinguish Liebi on the basis that
ZSAFED had been used previously to protect the environs of a public project rather than
to preserve the value of private property. Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807, 816-17
(Mo. 1969). See also United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co, 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Attorney
Gen. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899); Bunyan v. Commissioners, 167 App.
Div. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 622 (1915).
Kindle did not clearly resolve the issue of the legitimacy of converted uses. The. 1925

and 1943 restrictions were apparently of questionable validity so that zoning the property
for single family development in 1963 under the police power would leave these uses as
vested nonconforming uses. If the uses had been established illegally, of course, it would
have .been possible to make them conform to single family zoning under the police power.
19. 58 Minneapolis Council Proceedings 1154 (1912).
-20. Ch. 98, §1, [1913] Minn. Laws 102; Ch. 420, §§1-4, [1913] Minn. Laws 618.
-21. -State ex rel. Roerig v. City of Minneapolis, 156 Minn. 479, 162 N.W. 477 (1917);
State *ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 154 Minn. 926, 158 N.W. 1017- (1916).
22. Attorney Gen. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E.77..(1899): .
.
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a minimum of consultation . .23 ZSAFED came to Minnesota, authorized
24
by state statute.
The Act, which applied to Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, permitted
the city council to create restricted residential districts on petition of 50
percent of the owners of real estate in an area.25 The city was given the
power of eminent domain to acquire the right to develop for anything but
residential purposes. 26 After notice to the record title holder of the property,
a visit to the property, and a hearing, appointed appraisers determined the
amount of damages to each parcel from the taking.2 7 They also assessed
benefits in the district. These benefits were offset against damages, leaving
a net damage or net benefit to each parcel. Net benefits were specially
assessed, although the total benefits assessed in the district could not exceed
the total amount of damages plus costs.2 8 The last step of the procedure fell

to the city council, which confirmed the determination of damages and

benefits.2 9 The damages were "a charge upon the city . . . [while] assessments
[for benefits were] . . . a lien and charge upon the respective lands until

paid.' 30 If there was a delay in payments, interest was charged on the award
of damages31
Maps of the restricted region were filed to establish the boundaries of
the districts.32 The county auditor received a copy of the maps and the
assessments on each parcel and collected them along with general property
taxes. 33 If nonresidential buildings were thereafter erected on restricted
property, the structures were declared to be nuisances.34 After operating under
this system for a short time, cities found that appraisals were becoming expensive; thus, the statute was amended to make it clear that appraisal costs
would be assessed to the area rather than paid by the city. 35

23.

Rockwood, The Minnesota Residence District Act of 1915, 1 MINN. L. REV. 487,

490-91 (1917).
24. Ch.128, [19151 Minn. Laws 180 (now MINN. STAT. §462.12-.17 (1974)).
25. Ch.128, §1, [1915] Minn. Laws 180.
26. Ch.128, §2, [1915] Minn. Laws 180.
27. Ch.128, §3, [1915] Minn. Laws 180-85.
28. In re Establishment of Restricted Residence Dist., 151 Minn. 115, 186 N.W. 292
(1922).
29. Ch.128, §3, [1915] Minn. Laws 182.
30. Ch. 128, §3, [1915] Minn.. Laws 183.
31. Id.
32. Ch.128, §4, [1915] Minn. Laws 185.
33. Id.
34. Ch. 128, §6, [19151 Minn. Laws 186. The statute received a good press. "It is
open to question whether there is not unwisdom in some cases in the exercise of the police
power to its fullest extent, no matter how desirable the object. Aesthetic ideals are in
proper cases well worth paying for .... There is no question but that in some instances
the exclusion of business from a neighborhood causes hardship to individuals. A controlling
motive on the part of those who advocate restrictions is often the preservation of their
own property values and frankly so. In such cases, if there is no adjustment of damages
and benefits someone loses. It may be a very much sounder policy to require those
who are benefited to compensate those who lose." Rockwood, supra note 23, at 491-92.
35. Ch. 297, [1919] Minn. Laws 305.
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Thwarted by the ordinance, the owner of a three story apartment house
in one of the restricted residence districts challenged the ZSAFED system in
court. In response, the city incorporated a scholarly article on the subject
into its brief.36 In a three to two decision, the Minnesota supreme court decided
in favor of the landowner The court noted eminent domain may be used
only to acquire property for public use: "A condemnation against an apartment house is not for a public use."38 The court distinguished a series of other
cases that had upheld the use of regulation with compensation to preserve
aesthetic vistas around public facilities.39

As a commentator subsequently noted, the decision "seal[ed] one avenue of
progress in the general program of the improvement of city life." 40 This
criticism moved the court; when the case was reargued, one judge changed
his mind and ZSAFED was found to be constitutional.41 The new majority
analogized the public utilization of ZSAFED to the implementation of a

drainage district 42 and lauded the new act on policy grounds.43

In another application of ZSAFED, the City of St. Paul had established a
restricted residence district along Summit Avenue, a distance of some four

miles. A few areas were excluded, such as an area where expensive apartment
buildings already existed. Other lots had also been excluded because they

were part of another proceeding, later abandoned, that was attempting to
establish a separate district. In a challenge to the exclusion, the court refused

to invalidate the restriction because it found no gross irrationality in the
36. Wiggin, The Power of the State to Restrict the Use of Real Property, 1

MINN.

L.

Rlv. 135 (1917).
37. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885
(1919).
38. Id. at 12, 174 N.W. at 888.
39. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 688 (1896); Attorney Gen.
v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899); Bunyan v. Commissioners, 167 App.
Div. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 622 (1915); In re New York, 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N.Y.S. 196 (1901).
40. Comment, The Failure of the Minnesota Residence District Act, 4"MINN. L. 11Ev.
50 (1919).
41. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159

(1920).
42. Id. at 21, 176 N.W. at 163. "The public acquires no more right to pass over
or to occupy any part of the land of the drainage system other than the public, as
such, does under the taking in the act under consideration. The direct benefits are
to the individuals owning the land comprising the drainage district, the same as the
owners of lots in the restricted building district." Id.
43. Id. at 19-20, 176 N.W. at 162. "The absence of restrictions of use .. . gives occasion
for extortion . . . [by] unscruplous and designing persons securing lots in desirable
residential districts and then passing the word that an apartment or other objectionable
structure is to be erected. . . . [The people in the area are then] forced to buy the
lots so held at exhorbitant [sic] price. . . . [W]hen this occurs in territory occupied by
people of modest homes and moderate means ... there is nothing to do but to submit
to the loss and the injustice. There should be a lawful way to forestall such wrongs." Id.
Such language could well be used to support conventional zoning under police power as
well as restrictions under ZSAFED. The court's economics also left something to be
desired. It is doubtful that persons of modest means could or would organize to buy
offensive lots.
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scheme. 44 The result was not unexpected: courts usually act with restraint
in second-guessing the propriety of district boundaries for zoning and for
45
special assessments.
While not central to the case, the workings of ZSAFED were the subject
of some observations by the court. The court noted that because interest
is paid on damages, the amount to be assessed might increase substantially
in the event of delay. Furthermore, the expense of proceedings that are
subsequently abandoned falls on the city if no other provisions have been
made.

46

Another possible problem with ZSAFED was raised in Dexner v.
Houghton.47 The plaintiff had applied for a building permit to construct a
three story apartment building, although he knew a petition was being circulated to create a restricted residential district and that the building inspector
had been directed to issue no building permits in the area pending the
council's decision on the matter.48 The apparent goal of the application was
to increase the plaintiff's damages when the residential district was later
created. His suit for the permit was unsuccessful. The court analogized the
situation to one in which a property owner, who has notice of a proposed
taking, builds a structure on the property in an attempt to increase the condemnation award.4 9 While ideally the commencement of an eminent domain
action and the payment of compensation should be concurrent, the court
50
indicated that concurrence of these two events is a practical impossibility.
A temporary deprivation of the building permit does the landowner no harm.
If the proceedings move reasonably expeditiously, the city may properly refuse
the permit and award damages in due course. 51
Minnesota:ZSA FED Tested and Improved by Experience
Perhaps ZSAFED's failure to provide for a change in established restrictions
44.

In re Establishment of Restricted Residence Dist., 151 Minn. 115, 186 N.W. 292

(1922).
45. See, e.g., Keller v. Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. 99, 11 P.2d 448 (1932).
46. Id. at 118, 186 N.W. at 295. The court also addressed the statutory provision for
city-appointed appraisers. Affected landowners did not participate in the appointment decision. Id. at 120, 186 N.W. at 294. The statute also provided for court-appointed appraisers
in the event of an appeal. Id. at 121, 186 N.W. at 294-95. But the statute was not clear
as to whether court-appointed appraisers were required if the court found the councilappointed appraisers had done their job properly. The court held that the council-appointed
appraisers did not constitute a sufficiently impartial tribunal to do the serious work of
fixing damages as in eminent domain and assessing benefits as in taxation. id. at 122, 186
N.W. at 295. Either there had to be some means for landowners to assure themselves of
the disinterestedness and general qualifications of the appraisers or the appraisers had to
be fulfilling some elected office. Id. Therefore, the landowners on appeal were entitled to
have court-appointed appraisers redetermine benefits and damages, even if the councilappointed appraisers had proceeded properly. Id. at 122, 186 N.W. at 295-96.
47. 153 Minn. 284, 190 N.W. 179 (1922).
48. Id. at 285, 190 N.W. at 180.
49. Id. at 288, 190 N.W. at 181. The court reaffirmed this position in State ex iel.
Burton Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 153 Minn. 518, 190 N.W. 979 (1922).
50. 153 Minn. at 288, 190 N.W. at 181.
51. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss3/2

6

Hagman: Zoning by Special Assessment Financed Eminent Domain (ZSAFED)
1976]

ZSAFED

had been an oversight. Alternatively, given the static, -end-state nature of
zoning in its early days, it is possible that the drafters of the ZSAFED statute
did not contemplate this need. In any event, not until 1923 did it become
apparent that a means for undoing the application of ZSAFED to particular
property was required. In that year, the Minnesota legislation was-amended
to provide that on petition of 50 percent of the owners of the real estate in a
with damages
district, the restrictions could be removed by the city council
52
and benefits assessed as on the formation of the district.
Early in 1925, to judge from the legislative activity, ZSAFED was still
viable in Minnesota. The statute was amended to make it clear that the
prohibition of nonresidential uses began as of the date of the resolution
adopting a restricted residence area even though damages and benefits were
not yet determined. 53 The legislature also permitted cities to issue bonds
secured by the special assessments so that money could be raised to pay
damages. 54 Such bonds are typical in conventional special assessments. Finally,
the statute permitted assessments to be paid in annual installments, another
typical special assessment practice. 55
At the same time ZSAFED was being refined, zoning under the police
power was becoming well accepted and, in fact, Minneapolis had continued
to zone without paying compensation. When ordinary zoning was challenged
in 1925, the Minnesota supreme court upheld it,6 indicating a preference for
zoning by exercise of the police power.
[A]n award of damages to obtain a restricted residential district is
largely theoretical, and, resulting in a possible incumbering of property
with something akin to an easement, is practically objectionable. If
restricted residential districts are to be established, there are substantial
reasons why the result should be accomplished through the exercise of
the police power.57
Fortunately, there had been enough districts established under ZSAFED
by 1925 so that its merits could be subject to the crucible of experience. In one
case, for example, a landowner in Duluth sold property by means of a
contract calling for delivery of a deed without encumbrances. Prior to delivery
of the deed, the property was placed in a restricted district. If the restriction
had been by conventional zoning, the restriction would not be regarded as
an encumbrance, but under ZSAFED, an interest in the property is actually
52. Ch. 133, [1923] Minn. Laws 142. "No use has yet been made of the authority
conferred by this act [the 1923 amendment], and it is likely that a simpler and more
clearly defined procedure, such as was proposed in a bill in the 1927 session of the legislature, will be necessary to produce the desired ease and flexibility of change." Anderson,
Zoning in Minnesota; Eminent Domain vs. Police Power, 16 NAT'L MUN. REv. 624, 629
(1927). It is not known what the proposed 1927 amendment contained because it was

never enacted.
53. Ch. 122, §1, [1925] Minn. Laws 110. This statute in effect codified the decision
in Dexner v. Houghton, 153 Minn. 284, 190 N.W. 179 (1922).
54. Ch. 122, §2, [1925] Minn. Laws 111.
55. Ch. 122, §4, [1925] Minn. Laws 112.
56. State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 148, 204 N.W. 569, 569 (1925).
57. Id.
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taken. Noting that the buyer was entitled to the condemnation award, the
court held that the restriction was not such an encumbrance as to allow the
purchaser to rescind the contract and recover the purchase price. 58
Another case established that just as zoning does not affect the validity of
restrictive covenants, zoning under the police power does not affect ZSAFED.
In State ex rel. Masden v. Houghton, 9 a multiple dwelling building permit
was denied to the owner of a lot that had been restricted under ZSAFED and
subsequently zoned under the police power for multiple dwellings. Holding
that ZSAFED restrictions were not eradicated when the property was zoned
for multiple family housing, the court noted that a procedure for undoing
the ZSAFED restrictions had been provided. The owner or his predecessors had
been paid damages previously; therefore, he could not now reverse the restrictions except by persuading a sufficient number of the other owners to
petition the city council and to accept a possible assessment when the restriction is removed.
Securing the agreement of enough owners to petition for removal of
restrictions from the entire original district is difficult. Thus, pressure mounted
to make this release process easier. In 1931 the legislature provided that 50
percent of the owners of a portion of the original district could petition for
vacation of the restrictions. 0 This portion, however, had to be on an end
of the district, an entire block, or a section of a district that is adjacent to a
nonresidential district. The 1931 legislation also provided that overlapping
zoning under the police power should not be considered in determining the
value of property on vacation of a district.61 Because cities were apparently no
longer willing to accept the cost of abandoned proceedings to establish
districts,2 the 1931 amendments also required petitioners to deposit their
63
probable costs.

58. Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209 N.W. 323 (1926).
59.

182 Minn. 77, 233 N.W. 831 (1930). This case concerned restricted residence district

No. 44, which suggests that many districts were established in Minneapolis under the
1915 Act. District No. 44 was established in 1922. Id. 79, 233 N.W. at 832. One commentator,
however, reported that following the adoption of comprehensive zoning power in 1924,

only one small district in Minneapolis had been restricted under the 1915 Act and that
the status prior to 1924 was as follows:
City

Number of residence
districts established

Percentage of
city's area affected

Minneapolis
St. Paul
Duluth

26
7
9

Less than 1%
1.22%
Less than 0.5%

See Anderson, supra note 51, at 628.
60. Ch. 290, §1, [1931] Minn. Laws 337.
61. Id.
62. See In re Establishment of Restricted Residence Dist., 151 Minn. 115, 118, 186
N.W. 292, 293-94 (1922) (the court noted that the city would bear the costs of proceedings
that were abandoned before a district was established).
63. Ch. 290, §2, [1931] Minn. Laws 339. The costs of vacating a district were also
likely covered by this provision, which makes ZSAFED even more stable.
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Finally, the 1931 statute amended ZSAFED to provide for notice of the
commencement of proceedings for establishment or vacation of a district
64
to the owner and mortgagee rather than only to the property tax assessee.
The mortgagee has an obvious interest in having knowledge of these matters

that might affect security.
. ZSAFED was not amended again until 1943. This amendment permitted
the city council to allow the conversion of buildings in restricted residential
areas into fourplexes if the buildings had 1,000 or more square feet. 65 The
constitutionality of such a change was questionable since it is dear that
ZSAFED's purpose was to exclude apartment buildings from single and double
residence districts. Nevertheless, it had been over 25 years since some restricted
residential areas had been created, and these neighborhoods had changed.
Despite this plea of changed circumstances, the court sustained an injunction
against remodeling a single family dwelling in a restricted area into a fourplex.66 Today, there are still ZSAFED districts in Minnesota, some of which
date back approximately 60 years.
Wisconsin
In 1917 the Village of Shorewood, Wisconsin, secured passage of a statute67
that empowered it to "regulate and restrict the location of trades, and industries and the location of buildings designed for specified uses, and -to
establish districts of such number, shape and area as it may deem best
suited ....
'68 The statute further provided:
Any person sustaining loss or damage in his property by any such
restriction or regulation may file his claim therefor ... and thereafter
the said village board shall act upon such claim and allow or disallow
the same or such part thereof as they may in their discretion deem
just and equitable.69
The village board did not have final discretion to deny damages since
the landowner could apply for a court determination of "the loss of damage
sustained... by reason of such restriction or regulation."70 Moreover, the
village did not have to pay for the damages itself.
[T]he... village board may... levy and assess ...

a tax upon such

property in such district affected by said restriction or regulation and
within three hundred feet thereof as it shall determine is specially
benefited thereby . .. .
64. Ch. 290, §3, [1931] Minn. Laws 39.
65. Ch. 246, [1943] Minn. Laws 548-50.
66. Burger v. City of St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 299, 64 N.W.2d 73, 82 (1954). See also
State ex rel. Sheffield v. City of Minneapolis, 235 Minn. 174, 50 N.W.2d 296 (1951) (upholding
a restriction 30 years after its imposition).
67. Ch. 507, [1917] Wis. Laws 839-41.

68. Id. §3.
:69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Pursuant to the statutory authority, the village passed an ordinance
dividing itself into business and residential districts. In response to this
division, a property owner, whose land was located less than a block from
the part of the village already developed in business uses, filed a claim with
the village when his property was zoned residential. The village denied the
claim; however, the Wisconsin supreme court, recognizing the right of the
72
landowner to seek damages, approved the remedy created by the statute.
MODERNIZING

ZSAFED FOR THE 1970's

Introduction
On February 7, 1975, Los Angeles City Councilman John Gibson observed
that:
[T]he law does not presently provide for compensating individuals for
losses incurred because of downzoning of property, nor does the City
receive compensation by73 property owners who have benefited from upzoning their property.
Most likely, Councilman Gibson did not know he was expressing sentiments
similar to those expressed by councilmen in Kansas City as early as 1893.
In any event, Gibson's observation preceded a motion that documents be
74
prepared to put the matter on the ballot as a charter amendment.
In another recent development Representative Kulongoski introduced
House Bill 3026 in the 1975 Regular Session of the Oregon Legislative
Assembly. A summary, printed with the bill, stated that:
[The bill] [a]llows owners of real property, whose property decreases in
assessed value more than 25 percent after [a] governmental land use
decision .. .to recover one-half of [the] decrease. [It] [r]equires owners
of real property, whose property increases in assessed value more than
25 percent, to pay one-half of [the] increase to [the] county when
property [is] sold or developed. 5
Bills are easy to introduce and motions are easy to make, but passage
is another matter. These two examples do not constitute a groundswell for
a modernized ZSAFED.

72. Pera v. Village of Shorewood, 176 Wis. 261, 264, 186 N.W. 623, 624 (1922). The
court expressly left open the question of the statute's constitutionality. Id.
73. Motion by John S. Gibson, Jr., Councilman, 15th District, Los Angeles, Cal., Feb.
7, 1975.
74. The matter was referred to the planning committee of the council, which referred
it to the city attorney and to the planning department. On January 30, 1976, a planning
committee of new members "reviewing 'old' files . . . received and filed" the matter
"inasmuch as a similar issue under Assembly Bill 828 is not progressing toward passage in
the State Legislature." A.B. 828 was a proposal only for compensation for wipeouts. In
any event, its success or failure had little relevancy to the charter amendment proposal.
See File No. 75-653, Los Angeles City Clerk's Office.
75. Summary, Ore. H.B. 3026 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by Rep. Kulongski).
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ZSAFED was originally devised because zoning without compensation was
thought to be constitutionally impermissible. The courts have since allowed
governments to severely restrict usage of property through zoning under the
police power without paying compensation." Modern ZSAFED would be
implemented for moral rather than legal reasons. First, a person whose
property loses value because of government regulation would be entitled to
receive payment for the damages as in an eminent domain proceeding. Second,
a person whose property increases in value solely because of regulation by
government should not be allowed to keep the unearned profit. To effectuate
these goals in the 1970's, ZSAFED must be modernized.
Appraisals
The fact that ZSAFED, as originally practiced, involved appraisals by
specially appointed persons increased administrative costs.77 Tax assessors
could do appraisals in a modern system, which would avoid duplication of
costs. The assessor's present job is to measure the market value of property
and to reassess property affected in value by a rezoning.78 ZSAFED would
require only a computation of the change in value.
Unfortunately, assessment practices in many areas are grossly improper.
Implementation of ZSAFED, however, would warrant the allocation of additional funds and would focus increased attention on the assessment system.
Under ZSAFED, assessments would be examined frequently and intensely
in contrast to the present system in which the assessor is seldom called on
to justify an assessment in court.
The Amount of Recapture/Mitigation
It would not be desirable to attempt to compensate 100 percent of damages
76. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Products v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342,
20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
Recently, a bill was introduced in the Florida Legislature to require governmental
divisions to find a "public purpose" before creating a restriction on the use of privately
owned real estate. Fla. H.R. 3810 (Reg. Sess. 1976, introduced by Reps. Morgan, Bloom, Lewis,
et. al.). This determination could be challenged in circuit court as long as the landowner
could prove that he had suffered an economic loss. Even if the court determines that
the restriction at issue was a valid exercise of the police power, the court may still order
compensation for the owner "for the diminution in value to the land." Fla. MR. 3810
§3(1). The bill died in the Committee on Natural Resources on June 4, 1976.
Another bill was introduced in the Florida Senate during the 1976 session that provided
for "a cause of action for the diminishment of property value as a result of land development regulations or coastal construction setback lines .... " Fla. S. 1270 (Reg. Sess. 1976,
introduced by S. Lewis 1976). The senate bill also died in committee. For a consideration
of the "taking" issue by the Florida Senate committee, see SEI.Ecr CoMitTrEE ON PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND LAND AcQuISITION, FINAL STAFF REPORT ON THE "TAKING ISSUE"

(Florida Senate,

Jan. 5, 1976);

SELECr CoMirrrEE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND AcQUIsrroN, FINAL STAFF
REPORT ON THE "TAKING ISSUE" (Florida Senate, April 15, 1976).

77. "The expense of the condemnation and assessment proceeding... was an appreciable
item .... " Anderson, supra note 51, at 629.
78. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §65863.5 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§402.2 (West Supp. 1975).
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or to recapture 100 percent of benefits because assessments are incapable of
precisely reflecting true value. Furthermore, total elimination of risk could
lead to stagnation and lack of change. ZSAFED should only minimize risk
by moderating wipeout and windfall rather than excluding them entirely.
Paying damages or assessing benefits of 50 to 75 percent of the change in
value would move in the direction of equity without eliminating the risk
inherent in a free market system. Similarly, slight changes in value should be
ignored. Before ZSAFED would operate, a substantial change- for example,
more than ten percent -should occur.
In most instances benefits will equal damages. If property is downzoned,
other property must become more valuable because competitive supply is
reduced. ZSAFED should recapture benefit even though it is more than is
necessary to pay damages from a particular change in zoning. Recapturing
all ascertainable benefits would provide funds to pay damages in those
instances when damages but not benefits can be determined. In addition,
one goal of a modern ZSAFED should be to recapture windfalls. Sharing
the benefit is the price of insurance against damage; moreover, planning may
actually create wealth by imposing order. 79 Benefits should exceed damages
in a community in which the planning is continually better; thus, the ZSAFED
fund might show a profit. In such a case, the excess fund could be applied
toward general government functions.
Stability
Whereas zoning under the police power has often been too easily changed,
0
ZSAFED was almost impossible to change in Minnesota, but extreme rigidity
is as undesirable as frequent rezoning. Under modern ZSAFED, the regulating
government, landowners, or voter residents in the area should be permitted to
initiate rezoning. Expanding the opportunity for change would not result in
the upzoning pressures traditional to zoning under the police power since
recapture eliminates much of the landowner's incentive to seek rezoning to
a more intensive use.
Multiple Land Use Controls
Increasingly, it is no "longer the case that zoning is the only control of
land use. Local governments are shifting to permit systems of control, and
control may also be exercised by one or more regional, state, or federal
authorities. Therefore, a rezoning alone does not trigger realization of benefit
or reception of damage. ZSAFED should be expanded to accommodate the
changing kinds of controls on land use. Developers must usually obtain various
permits before initiating a new project. For example, subdivision permission
79. Chicago School economists argue to the contrary that wealth generation is greatest
under free market conditions and that government control either dampens the increase

or causes net loss. B.

SIECAN, 1AND USE WrrHOUT ZONING

(1972), makes the most elaborate

case for the Chicago School in the context of land use.
80. "The entire public [under Minnesota's ZSAFED] gained a sort of restrictive easement . . . which it was almost impossible to change." Anderson, supra note 51, at 629.
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might be required before a windfall could occur. Even if that is obtained, a
sewer district may not be able to issue hookup permits because of the
constraints of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. If the quality of
the air might be deteriorated by the extra development, an Environmental
Protection Agency permit might also be required. Consequently, a rezoning is
not the only benefit or damage creating governmental activity.
This system of multiple permits from different levels of government
complicates matters. A benefit is measured as the change in values before
and after, but before and after what is the crucial issue. If, for example, five
permissions are required before development can proceed, does the assessor
make a determination of assessable benefits as each is obtained? Alternatively,
since the project is not viable until all permits are obtained, should the
before value be calculated as if no permit had been obtained and the after
value as if all permits had been obtained?
The problem is a muddle of the first order. Perhaps the solution is as
follows: if there is a governmental activity after which actual development
would be possible when it was not previously possible, that activity is the
event that triggers the determination of benefit or damage. The solution
has problems, particularly if ZSAFED is built on an assessment system because
the market will anticipate the benefit-damage triggering activity. When the
first permit is issued, value may rise a bit; on the second permit value would
increase a little more, and so on. The increase in value between the fourth
and fifth permits may also be small, but under the suggested solution, the
assessor will have to determine benefit or damage as if all five permits had
been obtained at once.
The matter of multiple controls raises one other issue. Under the 1931
amendment to the Minnesota ZSAFED statute, other regulations were to be
disregarded for the calculation of benefits and damages when ZSAFED was
undone.3 1 This would not be the case under modernized ZSAFED since all
land use controls would carry compensation and recapture incidents.
Government Projects
Benefits and damages from governmental development projects should
also be included in a modernized ZSAFED. For example, if a government
built a new causeway to Nirvana, making it more accessible, the benefits
should be recaptured in part. ZSAFED would thus tax the cost of improvements in the same way as traditional special assessments 2 but with the
difference that large projects would be included and recapture would not be
limited to costs. Similarly, if the government built a regional garbage dump
on the north end of Nirvana, owners of property on the south end could
be compensated by a modernized ZSAFED.

81. Ch. 290, §1, [1931] Minn. Laws 337.
82. For a more detailed discussion of the history of special assessments, see WINDFALtS
FOR WIPEOUTS? LAND VALUE GAINS AND LOssES FROM PLANNING AND A CATALOG OF METHODS

FOR RDISTRIBUTING THEm Ch. 13 (D. Hagman
cited as WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTs].

& D.

Misczynski, eds. forthcoming) [hereinafter
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ZSAFED and the Poor
No claim is made that ZSAFED will redistribute wealth from rich to
poor. To own property is to be rich and ZSAFED merely makes payments
from one set of property owners to another. But there is no reason for poverty
groups to oppose it.
Assume that Nirvana is conventionally zoned and that a parcel of land
before rezoning to multiple family use is worth $5,000. After rezoning, the
value would increase to $10,000, the price a developer of low income housing
would have to pay for a lot. If ZSAFED applies, it does not change the utility
of the lot zoned multiple family; instead, it adds a special assessment. The
assessment would be $2,250 if the rezoning triggers a recapture of half the
increase over 10 percent. Although the total cost of land becomes $12,250,
and the cost of low income housing would seemingly be increased, it does
not necessarily follow that the assessment will be passed on to the ultimate
consumer of the housing. The low income consumer may not be able to pay
it, and the high income consumer may be unwilling to pay the assessment.
The lot's value of $10,000 would not be increased by the assessment because
the value is set by the market. If the price of a lot on Nirvana increases above
its market value, buyers will seek other sites.
The message of traditional economic wisdom is that increases in taxes on
land, of which ZSAFED special assessments are a specie, are capitalized in the
land and absorbed by the landowner. If the amount is absorbed, the multiple
family lot could be purchased for $8,750 with the buyer agreeing to pay the
$2,250 special assessment. Thus, total costs of the land would be its market
value of $10,000.
There is doubt, however, that traditional economic wisdom is right.83
Indeed, under certain sets of assumptions, economists can "prove" that none,
some, or all of the tax is in fact passed on.
ZSAFED could even be used to aid the poor. For example, if the ZSAFED
fund showed a net profit, it could be used to subsidize low income developers
by allowing them to cancel a special assessment. This subsidy would benefit the
public by encouraging erection of low income housing that is at a good location and utilizes quality construction. Another possibility would be to rezone
a portion of the land on south Nirvana from single family to exclusive low
income multiple family use. The land's value would not increase and there
would be no special assessment. In this instance, ZSAFED would not differ
from conventional zoning.
The ZSAFED Fund
Under ancient ZSAFED, each restricted residential district was a distinct
entity. Because damages from restricting property to low density residential
use were often offset to each landowner by the benefit of having neighboring
property limited to residential use, little money was exchanged within a
district and none could exchange hands outside the district for the law did
be

83. Traditional economic theories concerning taxes and special assessments on land will
more fully explored in WINDFALLS FOR WVIPEOUTS, supra note 82, ch. 7.
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not cover extradistrict benefits and damages. Under modern ZSAFED, there
would be no districts. Damages and benefits would be identified by changes
in value wherever they occurred. For example, if property was rezoned
commercial for a shopping center and resulted in more than a 10 percent
increase in value, a special assessment would be levied. Neighboring property
might increase or decrease in value, and ZSAFED would assess benefits and
pay damages accordingly. If the damage showed up far from the rezoned
site, such as the location of an older shopping center, ZSAFED would pay
compensation.
Separate accounting for the damage caused and the benefit resulting from
each.-change -would. add. an unnecessary complication. Rather, when an
assessment is made, payments would go into a common fund; damage payments
would be made from the same fund. Revolving funds are customarily used
for local improvements that are funded partially by special assessments and
partially by government. This obviates the need to issue bonds to pay
damages.
Collectionsand Payments
It may be necessary, for constitutional reasons, to pay damages when
the damaging event occurs,8 4 but it will not be possible to recapture all benefits
immediately. Suppose, for example, the property of a single family homeowner
increases in value from $20,000 to $40,000 as the result of a rezoning. The
assessment would be $10,000,5 and a lien would be imposed immediately on
the property for that amount. For political reasons, however, immediate payment could not be exacted. The conventional practice of accepting payments
for special assessments by installments would be followed. For example, the
assessee might be given 18 years to pay at $500 per year plus interest. The
amount would be added to the property tax bill and collected in the same
way as other special assessments.
If damage payments also could be paid by installment, then it would not
be necessary to issue bonds to make such payments before the ZSAFED revolving fund had been established. Damage payments could be used to offset
property taxes. In actuality, while some property may remain unaffected,
other land is likely to be buffeted by damages and benefits frequently, each
canceling the other in a frenzy of activity that only computers could reconcile.
CONCLUSION

The administration of ZSAFED, although complicated, is essentially the
same as conventional property tax and special assessment practices. Moreover,
modern ZSAFED could replace many bodies of damage mitigation law thatresult in high administrative costs, such as nuisance, damages in eminent
84. If the payments are regarded as damages paid statutorily under the police power
rather than under the power of eminent domain, the damages need not be paid when
the property is "taken." People, Dep't of Transp. v. Hadley Fruit Orchards, Inc.,
130 Cal. Rptr. 287, 59 Cal. App. 3d 49 (1976).
85. Thi6 i* cal1lated at a 50% rate after disregarding the first 10%.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

15

670

FloridaOF
Law
Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

UNIVERSITY

[Vol. XXVIII

domain to severed parcels, inverse condemnation for regulatory and planning
blight, and invalidation of land use regulation under the "taking" clause. It
could also supplement or replace special assessments for particular projects,
exactions on development permissions, and impact taxes.
It is not yet clear that ZSAFED is an answer to windfall for wipeouts
problems. However, precedent certainly has established that ZSAFED is valid.
and this precedent should continue as ZSAFED is modernized. Armed with
early experience and improved by the theory developed in connection with
transferable development rights research, 86 ZSAFED may well have a future
as well as a past.
86. See note I supra.
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